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Abstract
This study investigates the impact of emigration on the political behavior of citizens in Egypt. In particular, it argues that
emigrants’ family members are more likely to vote for Salafi parties for several reasons, including the transfer of religious
remittances by Egyptian emigrants to the Gulf and the influence of transnational Salafi networks. In order to test our
argument, we conducted an original public opinion survey with around 1100 individuals between January 12, 2012 and
January 25, 2012, just after the Egyptian parliamentary election. We find that individuals with family members who had
emigrated to the Gulf voted heavily for Islamist parties, particularly the Freedom and Justice Party and the Nour Party.
Further analysis shows that there is no statistical difference between individuals with and without emigrant family
members in voting for the Muslim Brotherhood, while the Nour’s popularity among voters with emigrant family
members is substantial and statistically significant. In particular, we find that the strongest support for the Nour came
from individuals whose family members had immigrated to Saudi Arabia, whereas those whose family members had
immigrated to other countries, including other Gulf countries, do not differ significantly from non-emigrant family
members in their party preferences.
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Does emigration influence political attitudes and behavior?
Despite a vast number of studies on the association between
emigration and economic outcomes, only recently has a
burgeoning literature begun to investigate the overlooked
role of emigration on political change in the host country.
Focusing mostly on Latin America and using macro-level
regional/national or survey research, these studies have
reached differing conclusions. While Ahmed (2012) argues
that remittances decrease public spending and sustain auto-
cratic governments, Tyburski (2012) and Escriba`-Folch
et al. (2015) find that remittances have a positive impact
on support for political opposition and democratization.
Recent studies on public opinion polls, which focus mostly
on Mexico and South America, such as Pe´rez-Armenda´riz
and Crow’s (2010) study, provide empirical evidence that
families of emigrants are likely to participate in communal
activities and hold pro-democratic values. Others empha-
size the differential impact of emigration experiences on
various modes of political participation (Bravo, 2008;
Tyburski, 2012). While these studies do not find that emi-
gration has a statistically significant impact on electoral
participation at the national level, studies such as Pe´rez-
Armenda´riz and Crow’s (2010) do reveal a lower level of
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electoral participation and political interest in Mexican
municipalities with higher levels of emigration.
The major focus in these studies has been on the trans-
mission of values from developed democracies to author-
itarian regimes or new democracies. This is not surprising,
because these studies have focused on emigration from
Mexico and South America to the United States. This
regional focus has necessarily overlooked other types of
diffusion regarding emigration: emigrants also move to rich
authoritarian countries and socialize under authoritarian
cultures and political institutions, and they may develop
social and political norms and values associated with their
authoritarian host country. These emigrants internalize
these norms and values and transmit them to their home
countries through their various contacts with their relatives,
including face-to-face and phone/Internet contact. This
leads us to ask the following question: do migrants’ experi-
ences in nondemocratic countries lead to the transmission
of the host country’s political values to sending nations?
And does this influence also affect emigrants’ family mem-
bers’ party preferences in elections?
We focus on Egyptian emigration and examine the rela-
tionship between Egyptians’ emigration destination and
their family members’ party choice in the historic 2011–
2012 parliamentary election, the first free and open univer-
sal election in Egyptian history. In this election, the Nour
(Hizb al-Nu¯r), the party of Salafi groups—formerly non-
political groups that had once seen democracy as antitheti-
cal to Islam and whose aim had been to purify Islamic
rituals and practices—surprisingly emerged as the second
strongest party, with around 28% of the vote and 25% of the
seats. However, we still do not know how these seemingly
apolitical groups turned into a major political force in the
transition era or who supported them in the election.
Building upon the bridging democratization, political
behavior and Middle East literature, this study argues that
emigration to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia)
was one of the key factors in the electoral success of the
Nour Party. In particular, it asserts that political socializa-
tion in Saudi Arabia and the cross-national religious net-
works between that country and Egypt were effective in
transmitting Salafi religious doctrines to emigrants’ fami-
lies in Egypt, creating a fertile source for the political suc-
cess of the Nour.
In order to test our argument, we conducted an original
public opinion survey with around 1100 individuals over 2
weeks, between January 12, 2012 and January 25, 2012,
just after the Egyptian parliamentary election. We asked
extensive questions regarding whether the respondent or
anyone in their family was or had been an emigrant worker
and, if so, in which country they had worked. In addition,
we employed a battery of questions on party choice, reli-
gious denomination, and other important factors, such as an
assessment of the household and national economy. Even
though the Supreme Constitutional Court controversially
invalidated the parliamentary election in June 2012 on the
grounds that the electoral system violated constitutional
principles,1 our election survey provided us with a unique
opportunity to analyze voters’ party choices in the first free
and fair election in Egypt in which people were able to
disclose their true preferences.
We find that individuals with family members who had
emigrated to the Gulf voted heavily for Islamist parties,
particularly the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the
Nour Party. However, further analysis shows that there is
no statistical difference between individuals with and with-
out emigrant family members in voting for the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB), while the Nour’s popularity among
voters with emigrant family members is substantial and
statistically significant. In particular, we find that the stron-
gest support for the Nour came from voters whose family
members had immigrated to Saudi Arabia, whereas voters
with family members who had immigrated to other Gulf
countries did not significantly differ in their party
preferences.
The contribution of our research is manifold. First, this
study conducted one of the few election polls in Egypt
right after the historic 2011–2012 parliamentary election
and enables us to disclose the social bases of both Islamist
and non-Islamist parties. Second, it sheds light on an
important but overlooked phenomenon, namely, the rela-
tionship between emigration and political behavior. By
doing so, it also offers a new argument and empirical
evidence for the claim that the rise of Islamist parties in
Egypt is linked to Egyptian emigration to Saudi Arabia.
Third, while previous studies have examined how the
political socialization of immigrants from authoritarian
countries to democratic ones instills in them democratic
norms and values (Itzigsohn and Villacre´s, 2008; Pe´rez-
Armenda´riz and Crow, 2010; Pfutze, 2013; Rother,
2009),2 this study offers an original argument that socia-
lization in a nondemocratic context may also instill non-
democratic norms and values and lead to increased
support for parties that are not committed to democratic
values.
Subsequently, we will first discuss the brief history of
Egyptian emigration to Saudi Arabia and other countries.
We will then discuss the social, economic, and political
context in which Egyptian migrants have worked and lived.
After offering our argument, we will present our research
design and the findings.
Emigration to the Gulf and other countries
The history of Egyptian emigration extends to the pre-1950
period, during which the modest demand for labor in the
newly emerging political entities in the Gulf was a result of
their discovery of oil and natural gas in their territories.
However, the scale of emigration during these years was
small (Errichiello, 2012). What intensified the flow was the
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combination of the demand for white- and blue-collar labor
from the new sheikhdoms in the former British protecto-
rates in subsequent years and political turmoil and repres-
sion in Egypt in the 1950s. In particular, political repression
of the MB under King Farouk and, more significantly, the
crackdown on the MB beginning in 1954, using the pretext
of the assassination attempt against Nasser, caused many
members of the MB to seek refuge in other countries. Thou-
sands of its members were detained in camps in the Sinai
Desert, where they faced torture and death, while the rest
either went underground or found refuge in Libya, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf countries, which welcomed
the relatively educated cadres of the MB (Munson, 2001).
The newly emerging kingdoms desperately needed teach-
ers, administrators, and professionals because the level of
education in these states was strikingly low. For example,
even in Kuwait, the country with the most developed edu-
cational system in the Gulf at the time, only about 7% of the
population had completed secondary education (Birks and
Sinclair, 1979b).
While political reasons were initially responsible for
Islamists’ emigration from Egypt to the Gulf, economic
reasons replaced them shortly thereafter: the newly estab-
lished socialist Arab republic could not fulfill its promise
to guarantee jobs to all educated Egyptians and could not
solve growing unemployment in the country. In addition,
the significant wage differences for white- and blue-collar
jobs between Egypt and oil-rich countries, including
Libya, Iraq, and the Gulf countries, increased the incen-
tive to emigrate to those countries (Birks and Sinclair,
1979a).3
Migrants from the Arab World, including Egyptians,
were mostly educated—teachers and administrators—up
to the early 1970s. Egyptian emigrants participated in
state-building processes in the Gulf, taking positions in
areas ranging from administration to unskilled labor.
According to Hadley, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
in 1974, 54% of government employees, mostly Arabs,
were foreigners, while in Oman 18% were foreigners. At
around the same time in Qatar, 36% of all government
workers were nonnationals and 13% of government jobs
were vacant. In Kuwait, the numbers were even higher than
in the UAE (Hadley, 1977). Troubled by the rise of Arab
nationalism, these new regimes, especially Saudi Arabia,
welcomed the Islamist leaders, professionals, and workers
who established their networks, provided that they did not
interfere in domestic politics and were loyal to the regime
(Choucri, 1986). The biggest economy of the region, Saudi
Arabia, prioritized Arab immigration to such a degree that,
at their peak in the 1970s, about 90% of all migrant workers
in the country were Arabs (Birks and Sinclair, 1979a).
Unlike non-Arab workers, Egyptian and other non-Gulf
Arab migrants moved to the Gulf states with their families,
thereby increasing the non-Gulf Arab population there.
And they stayed in these countries much longer than their
Asian, European, and American counterparts (Choucri,
1986).
The biggest financial impetus for the increase in emigra-
tion from Egypt and other Arab and non-Arab countries to
the Gulf occurred during the post-1974 oil boom, which
attracted hundreds of thousands of people to relatively
well-paid jobs. Indeed, immigrants came to dominate sec-
tors like education (Choucri, 1986; Kapiszewski, 2006). In
the 1975–1976 academic year, Hadley (1977) found that
more than 25% of Egyptian teachers working abroad were
in Saudi Arabia.4
More significantly, during the second half of the 1970s,
new, mostly non-skilled immigrants from South Asia
(Indians and Pakistanis) responded to the demand for
labor arising from new development and infrastructure
projects (Choucri, 1986; Sayan, 2004). According to Birk
and Sinclair (1979b), up until the 1970s, despite increas-
ing demand for South Asian workers, 91% of migrant
workers in Saudi Arabia, 93% in Libya, and 69% in
Kuwait were from Arab countries. Exceptions were the
UAE (25%), Qatar (27%), and Bahrain (21%). A signifi-
cant proportion of these migrants were Egyptians who
were overemployed in professional jobs requiring univer-
sity or postsecondary degrees in these countries (Birks and
Sinclair, 1979b).
The decrease of oil prices in the 1980s slowed down the
development projects. In this era, Kapiszewski (2006)
notes that economically cheaper and politically safe Asian
migrants outnumbered their Arab counterparts in Bahrain,
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, while 70–80% of migrant
workers in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were still Arabs.5
However, the real demographic change took place in the
1990s, especially after the Gulf War. Thousands of Yeme-
nis, Palestinians, and Jordanians were expelled from Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait because their governments did not sup-
port the US-led coalition forces against or were allied with
Iraq. Egypt’s pro-Gulf regimes policy brought favor to
Egyptian migrant workers in the Gulf states, while Asian
workers replaced Yemenis and Palestinians, whose govern-
ments took pro-Saddam positions (Kapiszewski, 2004).
This decreased the proportion of Arab migrant workers in
Saudi Arabia from 79% in 1985 to about 30% in the 1990s
and 2000s. Even so, official statistics show that, of the non-
Gulf Arab population in Saudi Arabia, there were 900,000
Egyptians, followed by 700,000 Yemenis and 300,000
Palestinians and Jordanians. Egyptians again made up a
significant proportion of the non-Gulf Arab population in
Kuwait and the UAE, numbering 260,000 and 140,000 in
2004, respectively (Kapiszewski, 2006). These official sta-
tistics may actually underestimate the extent of Egyptian
emigration to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, but it
clearly indicates that the cultural and religious interaction
between the Gulf and Egypt has consisted of more than just
financial flows from public and private organizations from
the Gulf.
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Argument: Religious remittances to Egypt
and transnational networks
To what extent does socialization under Saudi Arabia’s
theocratic regime affect people’s social and political pre-
ferences? Levitt (1998) argues that migrants transfer new
ideas, values, and behavior to their sending countries
through ‘‘social remittances.’’ In particular, everyday con-
versations between emigrants and relatives back home that
contrast political institutions in the host and home countries
are one of the major sources of social remittances. Contact
through face-to-face interactions, phone, or Internet can
affect people’s attitude toward political regimes and con-
tribute to civic and democratic values to bring ‘‘political
change’’ (Levitt, 1998; Pfutze, 2013; Pe´rez-Armenda´riz,
2014). A number of studies have examined the extent to
which individuals with and without emigrant family mem-
bers differ in their political participation in the home coun-
try, and the extent to which emigrants’ experience of social
and political norms in a democratic country has an impact
on the communal or electoral participation of their families.
Tyburski (2012), Pfutze (2013), and Escriba`-Folch et al.
(2015) find that remittances weaken the patronage links
between the dominant political party and society in the
home country, thereby increasing support for political
opposition. In particular, Pfutze (2013) and Pe´rez-Armen-
da´riz and Crow (2010) argue that communities with trans-
national ties can import not only remittances but also
political values from the host countries. Goodman and His-
key (2008) found that emigration has a positive impact on
non-electoral participation, while Pe´rez-Armenda´riz and
Crow (2010) show that the migration experience diffuses
to the family back home, increasing pro-democratic atti-
tudes and participation in the communal organizations of
Mexicans who have family abroad. In the analysis of six
Latin American countries, Co´rdova and Hiskey (2015)
found that individuals with cross-border ties in the United
States are more likely to participate in local politics and
show more sympathy toward a specific political party.
A few recent studies on other parts of the world suggest
similar findings: Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) find that
localities with more migration to developed democracies
are less likely to vote for the Communist Party in Moldo-
va’s parliamentary elections. Once Moldovans who have
been to Western Europe return, they demand similar polit-
ical institutions in their home country (Batista and Vicente,
2011). Emigration may also reduce electoral participation
and political interest, however, because remittances insu-
late emigrants’ family members from economic crises, high
inflation, and other economic problems. As a result, their
dissatisfaction with the government or regime may be
lower than that of non-emigrants. For example, Goodman
and Hiskey (2008) show that those with families abroad are
less likely to rely on the state for their needs, reducing their
interest in domestic politics. Moreover, along with Pe´rez-
Armenda´riz and Crow (2010) they find no statistically sig-
nificant relationship between emigration and electoral
participation.
These studies exclusively examine how the migration
experience in a developed democracy such as the United
States or Western European country influences the diffu-
sion of democratic norms and attitudes and the behaviors
that are associated with those norms. In contrast, our case
offers a unique opportunity to understand how migrants’
experience in an authoritarian country affects their and
their family members’ political preferences in the first
democratic election in Egypt. Even though the elections
and the first democratically elected parliament were inva-
lidated by the Supreme Constitutional Court in June 2012,
6 months afterward, and the military took power a year and
a half after that, it provides a unique opportunity to inves-
tigate people’s political preferences.
We examine another form of social remittances,
religious remittances, the transfer of religious norms and
values, and their impact on political choices. While pre-
vious studies have examined democratic norms, values,
tolerance, and support for democracy as the major social
remittances, the transfer of religious norms and values has
been ignored.6 The brief relatively democratic era in Egypt
enables us to investigate the impact of emigration to Saudi
Arabia and other countries on party choice, in particular, on
voting for the Nour.
We argue that religious socialization in Saudi Arabia
and its enhanced impact through transnational networks has
been influential in transmitting religious remittances and
contributing to the strength of the Salafi movement in
Egypt. In contrast, because of the absence of an official
religious doctrine as well as the nature of the political and
economic systems in countries such as Kuwait, the UAE,
and Qatar, these countries have not had the same impact.
They permitted alternative Islamic groups, whether local or
emigrant organizations,7 but Saudi Arabia was more
restrictive in this regard, especially after the deadly Siege
of Mecca incident in 1979 (Commins, 2006).8 Starting
from the 1970s, other Gulf countries increasingly brought
in thousands of imams each year from Egypt because of a
lack of desire among citizens to become religious clergy.9
In Saudi Arabia, in contrast, the Wahhabi religious elite
completely dominated the social, educational, and cultural
spheres, from designing school books to running religious
programs on TV, leaving almost no room for alternative
religious groups and their interpretations.10 There are sev-
eral reasons that Arab migrants in general, and Egyptians in
particular, are more likely to be exposed to and influenced
by the dominant religious doctrine than non-Arab migrants.
First, Arabic-speaking migrants are not socially isolated
from the locals, unlike Western and non-Arab migrants. As
indicated earlier, Arab migrants, unlike the domestic ser-
vants who come from Asia, bring their families to the
countries to which they emigrate (Kapiszewski, 2006). In
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addition, Arab migrants share the language and religion
with the locals, as a result of which they are more likely
to share space with them than are non-Arab migrants,
including by praying together and attending religious lec-
tures offered by (Salafi) religious leaders (Naithani et al.,
2010). Arab migrants, especially white-collar workers, are
more likely than non-Arab migrants to work in the same
place and live in the same housing units as locals or in near
proximity to them.
Second, the dominance of Wahhabism in the media and
the lack of alternative media channels have made it easier
to transmit Salafi values to migrant communities in Saudi
Arabia. Egyptian immigrants in Saudi Arabia are likely to
consume Saudi television channels and be exposed to their
messages. This consumption was higher in the pre-2000
era, when the regime restricted non-Saudi satellite channels
(Field and Hamam, 2009). In addition, the influence of
Salafism is stronger in schools. Migrant children can enroll
in public schools up until university free of charge. A siz-
able proportion of Egyptians who emigrate with their fam-
ilies are able to benefit from public schools because they
speak Arabic. In contrast, most non-Arabic–speaking
migrants (e.g. Indians, Pakistanis, and others), except
highly skilled workers, are single or cannot bring their
families, while Western and other migrants who bring their
families send their children to international schools. These
religious views and practices are transmitted to Egypt
directly through returnee emigrants or their contact with
family members by phone or through the Internet.
There is some empirical evidence for the relationship
between the rise of Salafism in Egypt and emigration. It
is reported that Salafi preaching in Egypt became more
visible in the mid- to late 1970s.11 Earlier studies have also
found that when migrants return to Egypt, they bring ideas
and lifestyles with them, including gender and clothing
norms. Wright (2012) argues that many emigrants, influ-
enced by the wealth of the Gulf, believe and preach to their
family members that if they removed bid’ah from Islam in
Egypt and the true Islamic community emerged, Egypt
would solve all its economic, social, and moral problems.
Saudi Arabia is prosperous because it follows the only true
path in Islam, the understanding and lifestyle of the Prophet
Mohammed and his companions. Returning emigrants
bring back norms and values similar to those that are domi-
nant in Saudi Arabia; they have been conspicuous in their
adoption of lifestyles, including attitudes toward women
and clothing.
We also further argue that transnational Salafi networks
reinforce the transmission of norms and values associated
with Salafism among emigrant families in Egypt. In partic-
ular, Salafi networks, which have been slowly expanding
since the 1970s, have helped make their messages heard
across Egyptian society and reinforced the Salafi messages
to which emigrant families have already been exposed,
regardless of whether they call themselves Salafi or not.
Salafi networks in Egypt and Saudi Arabia are intercon-
nected through charity and other types of organizations,
and these networks have been instrumental in supporting
the charity organizations, educational facilities, and other
organizations that promote Salafi teachings in Egypt.
During the Mubarak regime, Salafis’ focus on a virtuous
and apolitical lifestyle saved adherents from being targeted
by the regime, in contrast to the MB. Before the Arab
Uprisings, Salafis in Egypt shunned politics as religiously
prohibited (haram) and were occupied with purifying soci-
ety in line with the Quran and Sunna (Gauvain, 2010).
Mubarak, who came to power in 1981, condoned their
activities as a counterbalance to the political Islamist
MB, especially in the suburban and impoverished areas
of Cairo and other governorates (Al-Anani and Malik,
2013; Chalcraft, 2014). While the MB and jihadist Isla-
mists were imprisoned or moved underground in the
1990s, Salafis were able to spread their messages relatively
freely.
Høigilt and Nome (2014) argue that Salafi messages
effectively penetrated Egyptian society through the net-
works of Salafi preachers on the ground, ‘‘cassette preach-
ers,’’ who were popular in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s
and, since 2006, popular Salafi satellite TV stations, right
after the MB captured one-fifth of the seats in the 2005
parliamentary elections. At the same time, Salafi messages
have resonated not only with emigrant families already
familiar with them but also with poor families through their
social welfare programs, including free food distribution,
literacy classes, and cash transfers to the poor.
Until Egypt’s first free election, there was a great degree
of uncertainty regarding the extent to which Salafism had
been successful in appealing to people in the political
arena, as the absence of political doctrines among most
Salafi groups and the lack of electoral competition under
Mubarak disguised their true strength. The historic election
provided a unique opportunity to measure to the strength of
Islamist movements, including the Salafists, which decided
to participate in the democratic elections, contrary to their
long-held view that political participation was antithetical
to their beliefs.
Contextualizing the electoral scene during
Egypt’s historic elections
The first democratic election in Egypt was held between
November 28, 2011 and January 11, 2012. The election was
reported as having represented the will of the Egyptian
people and described as relatively free and without any
major rigging.12 The Egyptian electoral system was a com-
bination of both the proportional representation (PR) and
single-member district (SMD) systems. Two-thirds of the
seats were competed through political parties’ list under
PR, while the rest went to independent candidates through
the SMD. Even though there were attempts to create an
Karakoc¸ et al. 735
electoral coalition between the Islamist and secular parties,
such as between the FJP and al-Wafd, such attempts failed.
As a result, two Islamist blocs and several major secular
parties dominated the election (Hassan, 2012). The Salafi
alliance was led by the Nour Party and included a Salafi
party, Al-Asala, and another small Islamist party,
al-Fadhilla.
Before and during the January 25 Revolution, the Salafi
movement was composed of weakly organized groups
whose leaders were mostly religious sheiks interested in
preaching their doctrines. Salafi groups were initially
opposed to the removal of Mubarak from power, arguing
that believers, even if they were only nominally Muslim,
should obey the ruler so as to avoid chaos (Al-Anani and
Malik, 2013). However, Malik and Awadallah (2013) note
that as the fall of Mubarak became imminent, these groups
repositioned themselves by arguing that they had to defend
the rights of believers in the non-Islamic political system.
Major Salafi groups decided to participate in the election
after the January 25 Revolution. Their umbrella group, the
Salafi Call, was pivotal in forming the Nour.
In line with moderation theory, according to which
political parties reject radical platforms in order to increase
their electoral success, one would expect that participating
in elections would have led Islamist parties to moderate
their behavior and ideology (Gurses, 2014; Schwedler,
2013; Tezcu¨r, 2010; Wickham, 2004). However, the
regime collapse created a political environment in which
the leaders of the Islamist parties, including the Nour, did
not come under sufficient pressure to reduce their nonde-
mocratic statements and behavior. In addition to the polit-
ical uncertainty, as Schwedler (2013) pointed out, the
ideological rivalry between the FJP and the Nour led these
two parties to compete over religious voters, reducing their
incentive to moderate their behavior and ideology, which
increased skepticism toward them among secular
Egyptians.
Salafi charities and foundations in Saudi Arabia and the
UAE, feeling threatened by the possible victory of the MB,
favored the Nour, especially relative to the non-Islamist
parties. It has recently been reported that, with the help
of Saudi petrodollars, the Salafi movement was especially
successful in garnering support in rural areas through cha-
rities that were instrumental in reaching the poor and pea-
sants.13 According to a report in Der Spiegel, the Nour
received USD100 million from Saudi Arabia during the
electoral campaign.14 These funds, together with the
already strong Salafi networks, certainly gave the Nour
an advantage over other parties.15
The second bloc was the Democratic Alliance, domi-
nated by the political wing of the MB, the FJP, and includ-
ing other small liberal and Nasserist parties. Before the
Revolution, the Mubarak regime had not permitted the
MB to form a political party, as a result of which MB
candidates had participated as independents. The MB
formed its political party in April 2011, 7 months before
the parliamentary election.
Like the Nour, the FJP called for Sharia law as a source
of legislation, and the two shared similar positions on sev-
eral salient issues, which cast doubt on both parties’ dem-
ocratic credentials in the new era: for example, both were
initially opposed to the right of women and Copts to
become head of state, although growing domestic and inter-
national pressure caused them to reverse their position on
this issue.16 The two parties differed, however, in their
economic policies, while the FJP advocated for the creation
of a strong private business sector, the Nour was more in
favor of state involvement in the provision of health-care,
housing, and education to the poor (Kelley, 2012). Regard-
less of the two parties’ platforms, Masoud (2014) found
that both parties, and the FJP in particular, were perceived
as more in favor of redistribution than the other parties.
The first of the twomain non-Islamist political parties was
the Egyptian Bloc, an electoral alliance of the Free Egyp-
tians, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and Tagammu.
The second was Egypt’s oldest liberal political party, al-
Wafd (Hassan, 2012). Both were opposed to the Islamists’
stance on the role of religion in post-Mubarak Egypt. The
parties in the Egyptian Bloc differed in their views regarding
the role of the state in the economy. The most liberal among
them, the Free Egyptians, advocated a low flat tax rate and a
high degree of private sector involvement.
Another party, al-Wasat, a moderate Islamist party, was
an offspring of the MB, formed in reaction to the MB’s
ruling elites. Among its founders were Copts and former
members of the MB. Al-Wasat distanced itself from the
MB and developed a new party program that embraced a
civilizational concept of Islam that was more inclusive of
women and Copts (Stacher, 2002; Wickham, 2004). A
number of other parties also participated in the election,
but Table 1 suggests that they remained marginal in terms
of the votes they gathered.
Table 1 displays the election results. The Democratic
Alliance, dominated by the FJP, received 37.3% of the
votes in the PR elections, followed by 27.7% for the Salafi
Alliance, dominated by The Nour. The non-Islamist parties
were far behind them. In the PR elections, al-Wafd received
about 9.3% of the votes, the Egyptian Bloc 8.9% and Al-
Wasat about 3.7%. The FJP dominated the majoritarian
vote, in which it won 45% of the seats.
Research design
Data
We conducted face-to-face interviews in Egypt between
January 12, 2012, and January 25, 2012, with a sample of
adults over the age of 18. We employed stratified random
sampling, which enabled us to capture religious minorities
that are heavily concentrated in several governorates and
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cities. First, we derived our samples from the following
governorates, which host most of the population in Egypt:
Cairo, Alexandria, Giza, Qalyubia, Asyut, Gharbia, Qena, al
Sharqia, Dakahlia, Faiyum, Beheira, Minya, and Monufia.
Then we divided each of these governorates into urban and
rural areas and chose cities, towns and villages from urban
and rural areas in each governorate, but had to exclude vil-
lages in distant rural areas because of the difficulty of acces-
sibility and the cost. Afterward, using random sampling, we
selected households and individuals in each of these areas.
Even though the sample size was 1100, ‘‘no response’’ and
‘‘do not know’’ observations substantively reduced the sam-
ple size to 675 in our two main multivariate analyses.
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the respondents’ political party
choice. To capture their party choice, we asked respondents
which political party they voted for in the last election. The
most preferred choices were the FJP, The Nour, al-Wafd,
the Egyptian Bloc, and al-Wasat, in line with the official
election results. The survey results included several other
political parties, but we include only those that received
more than 2% support in the survey and the election. Those
that received less than 2% in the survey are labeled ‘‘oth-
ers.’’ We also note that a significant number of voters did
not vote or did not want to respond. We excluded them
from our multivariate analysis, given that our interest lies
in comparing political parties’ popular bases.
Independent variables
Our main independent variable is emigrant family mem-
bers.17 To measure whether respondents belonged to an
emigrant family, we asked them whether they or any mem-
ber of their family had worked abroad for at least 6 months.
To be more precise, ‘‘emigrant family members’’ include
individuals who worked abroad or who had a family mem-
ber who was currently doing so or had done so in the past.
Fourteen percent of the respondents were members of emi-
grant families. Then we asked which country they worked
or had worked in. Not surprisingly, a plurality, 32%, had
worked in the country with the biggest economy, Saudi
Arabia, while 12% had worked in Kuwait. They were fol-
lowed by the UAE (9%); Libya (6.4%); and Iraq, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, each with 4%. All other
countries received smaller percentages of emigrant
families.
One may assume that those who left for Saudi Arabia
were already sympathetic toward Salafism. Although we
cannot test the argument empirically, secondary sources
suggest that the Gulfization of Egyptian neighborhoods and
towns only began after the return of Egyptians from the
Gulf in the late 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, it seems likely
that the emigration experience in Saudi Arabia boosted the
positive perception of Salafism, which in turn may have
increased the likelihood of voting for the Nour. Second,
although political considerations were important in emi-
grants’ decision regarding their destination country of
Table 1. Egyptian Parliamentary Election, 2011–2012.
PR votes (%) PRseats (%) FPTPseats (%) Total seats (%)
Democratic Alliance 37.3 38.3 65.1 47.2
FJP – - - 45
Karama (Dignity) – - - 1.2
Revolution’s Tomorrow – - - 0.4
Hadara (Civilization) – - - 0.4
Labour – - - 0.2
Al-Nour 27.7 28.9 16.3 24.7
Al-Nour – – – 21.5
Construction and Development – – – 2.6
Al-Asala – – – 0.6
Al-Wafd 9.2 10.8 1.2 7.6
Egyptian Bloc 8.9 9.9 0.6 6.8
Egyptian Social Democratic Party – – – 3.2
Free Egyptian – – – 3
Tagammu (Association) – – – 0.6
Wasat 3.7 3 – 2
Reform and Development 2.2 2.4 0.6 1.8
Continuous Revolution 2.8 2.1 – 1.4
Egypt’s Nationalist Party 1.6 1.2 0.6 1
Freedom 1.9 1.2 – 0.8
Egyptian Citizen 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.8
Independents – – 13.9 4.6
Others 3.8 1.3 1.1 1.3
Note: The figures were derived from Hassan (2012: 373). FPTP: first-past-the-post; PR: proportional representation.
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choice in the mid-1950s and 1960s, particularly for MB
supporters, economic considerations became predominant
thereafter. Moreover, in general, most economic emigrants
have less freedom to determine their destination country.
Another important cleavage in Egyptian politics is the
role of religion in politics. Our public secularization (sup-
port for a smaller role for religion in politics) variable is an
index composed of three questions. The respondents were
asked to assess the following statements: religion and gov-
ernment should be separate; religious officials and leaders
should not influence how people vote in elections; and
religious officials and leaders should not influence govern-
ment decisions. The possible responses to these statements
vary from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). We
ran the factor analysis, which shows that one underlying
factor captures these three questions, and our a scale relia-
bility test showed that the reliability was high (Cronbach
a ¼ 0.80). The expectation is that those who hold secular
attitudes toward politics tend to vote for the non-Islamist
Egyptian Bloc and al-Wafd.
Previous studies have emphasized a number of factors
that affect voting behavior. For the sake of space, we will
discuss them briefly. The economic voting literature argues
that people’s perception of the economy significantly
affects how they vote in an election (Anderson, 2007), but
we should also take into consideration the political context.
In our model, we tested the impact of respondents’ assess-
ment of the household and national economy on party
choice. We employed two questions. First, compared to the
last 12 months, how had their household economy chan-
ged? Second, how did they assess the national economy
today compared to 12 months ago? The possible answers
were ‘‘better,’’ ‘‘almost the same,’’ and ‘‘worse.’’ Given
that the response for both questions was small, we recoded
better and almost the same as 0 and worse as 1. For both
questions, we tested the negative assessment of the house-
hold and national economy, given that only a minority
assessed the national economy positively.
We also used standard demographic variables such as
age, gender, employment status, and education. We expect
that those with a higher income and level of education are
more likely to vote for non-Islamist parties. According to
the dominant view, the popularity of Islamist groups in the
Mubarak era was based on the fact that their messages
appealed to a broad swathe of the population and that their
social services demonstrated their success (Woltering,
2002). One expects that those who benefited from these
services, the poor, were more likely to vote for the FJP or
the Nour, which took a strong welfare state position in the
election (Masoud, 2014). One also expects that those who
had a stable job and a high level of education were more
likely to support non-Islamist parties (Gumuscu, 2010).
A recent study found that religiosity did have a weak
effect on voters’ choices but that recipients of social wel-
fare were more likely to vote for the FJP, but not al-Noor,
than for non-Islamist parties (Masoud, 2013). Blaydes and
Linzer (2008) found that women are more likely to vote for
Islamist parties and that women were responsible for the
MB’s success in the election. The inclusion of the religios-
ity variable does not change the substantive interpretation
of our main variables, but it significantly reduces the over-
all sample. Therefore, we do not display it in our models
(see Supplementary Appendix B for the variation of reli-
giosity among supporters of different parties). Public
employees and individuals with lower paid jobs in Egypt
may have different party preferences than others. When-
ever demonstrations erupted in Egypt, the Mubarak regime
increased public employees’ salaries significantly, which
suggests that their dissatisfaction with the regime was con-
spicuous. In the absence of Mubarak’s National Demo-
cratic Party (NDP) in the election as a major party, we do
not have any expectation as to whether their grievances led
this group to vote for the non-Islamist or Islamist
opposition.
Egypt has a significant Coptic population. It is hard to
give an exact figure for the size of this population, but it is
believed to range between 9% and 20% (Tadros, 2013;
Zeidan, 1999).18 We asked the respondents about their reli-
gious affiliation; based on this question, we detected Chris-
tians (Copts and other Christian denominations) in the
country. Fourteen percent of respondents were Copts.
Although the FJP repeatedly stated that Copts are equal
citizens during the election campaign, its previous state-
ments on the eligibility of Copts to participate in the mil-
itary and become president was unable to alleviate their
concerns. Therefore, we expect that they likely voted for
non-Islamist parties.
Method
We run a multinomial probit analysis (MNP) in order to
predict individual vote choice and hold the FJP as a base
category. Choice models are theoretically based on the
expected utility calculations of individuals who have idio-
syncratic preference ordering and prefer one choice over
another (Long, 1997). Theoretically, we should assume that
any new alternative should not be irrelevant to an individ-
ual’s old preference order. In other words, having a pre-
ference for voting for the FJP is not independent from
voting for another Islamist party, such as the Nour. That
is why we preferred the MNP over the multinomial logit
analysis due to the relevance of the choices in the Egyptian
elections.19
Results
We first present the preliminary evidence using the cross-
tabulation analysis, which displays a crude relationship
between party choice and emigrant family members. Note
that respondents were asked whether they or their family
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members had worked in a foreign country for at least 6
months. Table 2 suggests that 31% of respondents with
emigrant family members voted for the FJP, while 29%
of those with non-emigrant family members did the same.
A t-test suggests that there is no especially significant rela-
tionship between emigrant families and the rest of the sam-
ple in voting for the FJP. In contrast, although the same
percentage of those with emigrant family members (31%)
voted for the Nour, only 15% of those with non-emigrant
family members did the same. The Egyptian Bloc and the
small parties in the Others category received a significant
number of votes from those with emigrant family members,
but they received more votes from those with non-emigrant
family members. Al-Wafd was the most disadvantaged
party in terms of the vote share it received from those with
emigrant family members, only 2%.
Although this result suggests that emigrant families are
an important part of the electoral base of Islamist parties,
especially Salafi ones, it does not tell us whether the coun-
try of destination affects this choice. For this reason, we
examined the relationship between the regions in which
emigrants had worked and party choice and then between
the three major countries of destination and party choice.
We divided the countries into three regions: the Gulf, non-
Gulf Arab countries (e.g. Iraq, Libya, and Algeria), and
Europe/North America. Then we focused on the three
major Gulf countries that have hosted the highest number
of Egyptian emigrants.
Table 3 suggests that emigrant family members who had
lived in the Gulf voted for Islamist parties, the FJP and the
Nour, 36% and 26%, respectively. These two parties also
performed well among those voters whose family members
had worked in non-Gulf Arab countries, receiving 32% of
the vote each, although the number of voters whose family
members had worked in these countries is much smaller.
The Egyptian Bloc performed much better among those
whose family members had worked in non-Gulf Arab coun-
tries (22%) and Europe/North America (38%). The FJP and
the Nour did poorly compared to the Egyptian Bloc among
those whose family members had worked in Europe/North
America, 19% and 25%, respectively. The findings on
emigrant families associated with Europe and North Amer-
ica may be due to the secular nature of politics in those
regions, while this does not exclude the fact that religious
networks still work to assist newcomers.20 A close look at
the data also shows that most Coptic emigrants moved to
Europe and North America and voted heavily for the non-
Islamist Egyptian Bloc.
Given that the Gulf countries received most of Egypt’s
emigrant workers, we decided to examine the relationship
between the Gulf country of destination and party choice,
listed in the last three columns of Table 3. The vote share of
the Nour increases to 32% for those connected to Saudi
Arabia, while the FJP’s vote share declines by a small
amount, to 32%. In contrast, we find that the FJP performed
significantly better than the Nour and other parties among
those with family members who had worked in Kuwait or
the UAE.
For a more rigorous test, we turn to our MNPs.21 Our
reference category for emigrant families in the multivariate
analysis is non-emigrant families. We run our models using
all parties, but the Nour as a reference category so that we
can see how the Nour performs relative to the Islamist and
non-Islamist parties, FJP, al-Wasat, al-Wafd, and the Egyp-
tian Bloc. Table 4 presents our results. It suggests that,
compared to non-emigrant families, those who had
migrated to Saudi Arabia were more likely to vote for the
Nour than the FJP or other parties. Other emigration desti-
nations do not exert any statistical significant impact on
party choice. For instance, those with family members who
had migrated to Europe or North America were neither less
nor more likely to vote for a particular party.
In order to present our results more substantially, we
have calculated the marginal effect for the Nour by emigra-
tion destination country. Figure 1 shows the marginal effect
of the Saudi variable and the non-Gulf Arab variable for the
Nour. Figure 1(a) shows that belonging to a family whose
members have worked in Saudi Arabia increases one’s like-
lihood of voting for the Nour by 9.5%. Figure 1(b) suggests
that belonging to a family with members who have
migrated to other Gulf countries reduces the probability
of voting for the Nour, but the result is not statistically
significant. In contrast, Figure 1(c) shows that belonging
to a family with members in non-Gulf Arab countries
increases the predicted probability of voting for the Nour
by 11.6%. The marginal effect of Europe/North America is
also not statistically significant (Figure 1(d)). However, the
size and almost statistical significance of the coefficient is
due to the reduced number of observations in our model.
Running the model only with the main independent vari-
ables and demographic variables (age, income, education,
gender, and religion) shows that the non-Gulf variable does
not have any statistically significant impact. We have pro-
vided this model in the supplementary appendix.
As for the other variables, we also calculated their mar-
ginal effects for all outcomes. We found that being secular
Table 2. Party choice for emigrant families.
Emigrant family member
Yes No
Political parties % %
FJP 31 29
Al-Nour 31 15
Al-Wafd 2 11
Egyptian Bloc 16 23
Wasat 5 4
Others 16 19
Total percentage 100 100
N 169 652
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decreases the predicted probability of voting for the FJP by
4% and for a-Nour by 2.5%, but increases the predicted
probability of voting for al-Wafd by 0.07% and the
Egyptian Bloc by 2.6%. As for the economic variables,
those who were not content with their household economy
were more likely to vote for the Nour by 6.4% and for
Table 4. Multinomial probit model: Party choice and emigrant families.
Al-Nour vs.FJP Al-Nour vs. Egyptan Bloc Al-Nour vs. Al-Wafd Al-Nour vs. Al-Wasat
Main variables
Emigrant family
Saudi Arabia 0.682** 0.046 0.245 0.424
0.300 0.425 0.517 0.436
Gulf Arab countries 0.551 0.919 0.828 0.547
0.446 0.676 0.670 0.455
Non-Gulf Arab countries 0.710 0.084 0.455 0.678
0.454 0.553 0.724 0.603
Europe/North America 0.190 0.075 0.105 0.555
0.733 0.943 0.942 0.882
Control variables
Support for secularism 0.012 0.440 *** 0.329*** 0.210***
0.028 0.041 0.040 0.044
Household economy 0.451 ** 0.250 0.436 * 0.001
0.200 0.232 0.250 0.281
National economy 0.105 0.050 0.541** 0.018
0.238 0.268 0.276 0.318
Income 0.074 0.066 0.091 0.147*
0.059 0.070 0.071 0.086
Christian 0.076 2.853*** 1.656*** 1.382**
0.613 0.448 0.492 0.561
Female 0.139 1.222*** 0.448* 0.327
0.201 0.227 0.237 0.270
Age 0.013 * 0.003 0.006 0.005
0.008 0.009 0.010 0.012
Education 0.042 0.150 * 0.314** 0.098
0.067 0.083 0.101 0.111
Public employee 0.178 0.043 1.002** 0.280
0.267 0.323 0.411 0.435
Unemployed 0.248 0.106 0.631 0.330
0.310 0.373 0.425 0.406
Constant 1.025* 4.759*** 5.412*** 4.425***
0.614 0.773 0.856 0.981
Note: N ¼ 675. Standard errors are below coefficient estimates; Log likelihood of model ¼ 787.87; Wald w2(70) ¼ 338.51. FJP: Freedom and Justice
Party.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 3. Party choice and emigrant families by emigration destination.
Political parties
Gulf Countries Non-Gulf Arab Countries Europe/North America
Major Gulf countries for work
Saudi Arabia Kuwait United Arab Emirates
% % % % % %
FJP 36 32 19 32 45 53
Al-Nour 26 32 25 32 5 31
Al-Wafd 3 0 0 3 0 8
Egyptian Bloc 9 22 38 9 20 0
Wasat 7 5 0 5 10 0
Others 19 9 18 19 20 8
Total percentage 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 102 22 16 59 20 13
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al-Wafd by 4.2%, but less likely to vote for the FJP by 5.5%
and for the Egyptian Bloc by 7%. The household economy
does not have any statistically significant impact on other
outcomes. Those who believed that the national economy
had worsened over the previous year were less likely to
vote for al-Wafd, but this view had no statistically signif-
icant impact on any other variable.
Copts were more likely to vote for any party other than
the FJP. Our calculation of marginal effects suggests that
being a Copt reduces the probability of voting for the FJP
by 22%, while it increases the probability of voting for the
Egyptian Bloc by 25%.
Women were less likely to vote for the FJP by 7% but
more likely to vote for the Egyptian Bloc by 15%. The
increase in educational level shows an interesting result:
people with a lower level of education were more likely
to vote for the Egyptian Bloc by 3.7%, while those with a
higher level of education were more likely to vote for al-
Wafd by 3.7%.22 These variables, female and education, do
not have a statistically significant impact on other out-
comes. Working for the public sector reduced the likeli-
hood of voting for al-Wafd by 8%, while its impact on
voting for other parties is not statistically significant. Older
people were slightly more likely to vote for the Nour
(0.2%). A higher income increased the predicted probabil-
ity of voting for al-Wasat by 1.2%.
Conclusion
The electoral success of the Salafi bloc in the Egyptian
parliamentary election in 2011–2012 attracted a great deal
of attention. The dominant view in the media is that finan-
cial flows from the Gulf into Egyptian Salafi movements
were responsible for their success: they helped create effec-
tive health clinics, educational facilities, and other social
services, which translated into electoral support for Salafi
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1. Emigrant family members and the Nour Party. (a) Saudi Arabia, (b) other Gulf countries, (c) non-Gulf Arab countries, and
(d) Europe and North America.
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groups, which, because they had absented themselves from
politics during the Mubarak era, were not tarnished by
association with the regime. Our argument differs from
these explanations that emphasize the supply of financial,
religious, or social services (Masoud, 2014).23 While we do
not deny the importance of these factors, we argue that
there is another important factor that scholars of democra-
tization and Middle Eastern studies have overlooked—reli-
gious remittances from Saudi Arabia through emigration.
Using an original public opinion survey, we tested our
argument and found supporting evidence: more than a third
of emigrant households in Egypt have worked in Saudi
Arabia and religious remittances did affect the electoral
results of the first democratic election in Egypt.
This research makes several contributions. First, it
speaks to the literature on political socialization and emi-
gration, in which scholars examine how emigration to dem-
ocratic countries instills democratic norms and values in
emigrants from authoritarian countries (Itzigsohn and Vil-
lacre´s, 2008; Pe´rez-Armenda´riz and Crow, 2010; Pfutze,
2013; Rother, 2009). While emigration may produce social
remittances conducive to democracy in countries such as
Latin America and the Caribbean, this relationship is not
unidirectional but multifaceted. This research suggests that
religious remittances as a result of emigration may instill
nondemocratic values, leading to support for political par-
ties skeptical of democracy. In this respect, this study, by
providing important empirical evidence regarding how
emigration shaped the outcome of Egypt’s first democratic
election, shows how authoritarian countries may affect
people’s religious orientation and their support for nonde-
mocratic parties.
Second, it allows us to draw a few important conclusions
about the electoral bases of Egypt’s the Nour Party. Emi-
grant families played a significant role in boosting the vote
for the Salafi bloc, and the implications of emigration on
citizens’ political views should be evaluated further. The
Gulf’s links to the strength of Islamism in Egypt has been
noted by scholars, but their research has focused on the
cash, religious materials, and funds sent to charities given
by either Gulf states or private donors from them to Islamist
organizations. To our knowledge, this is the first study that
investigates the impact of religious remittances on political
behavior. The effect of the Saudi connection through emi-
gration on apolitical and political Salafism should be fur-
ther studied to test whether emigration has a significant
effect on religious and political behavior in other countries.
Given that Saudi Arabia has been a magnet for millions of
people from Arab and non-Arab countries, especially since
the early 1970s, the Saudi connection to the diffusion of
Salafism through emigration may extend beyond Egypt.
We would like to end our discussion with recent polit-
ical developments in Egypt. The failure of the transition to
democracy in Egypt as a result of the military coup on July
3, 2013, has had important implications for the Nour in
particular and political and military Islamist movements
in general. The Nour had been weakened because its former
party leader, Emad Abdel Ghaffour, and other party mem-
bers could not reconcile their differences with the Salafi
Call leadership. Ghaffour and his supporters formed a new
party, al-Watan, in January 2013. The July 3 military coup
and the co-optation of the Salafi Call and its political wing,
the Nour, into the pro-military establishment by Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi, the coup leader and current president of
Egypt, eroded their credibility in the eyes of affiliated and
nonaffiliated Salafi groups, the Islamist electorate, and
much of society in general (Fahmi, 2015). Using the pretext
of an Islamist threat, the regime has sanctioned anti-
Islamist discourse in the media and adopted anti-Islamist
policies for the private and public sectors, which have fur-
ther weakened the co-opted Salafi Call and the Nour (el-
Sherif 2014). The initial 2015 parliamentary election
results confirm growing dissatisfaction with the Nour,
which, in the two rounds of elections, received only 12 of
568 seats open to contestation.24
The end of the democratic process as a result of the
military coup, the ostracization of Islamist parties in Egyp-
tian politics and anti-Islamic discourses has resulted in the
weakening of Islamist parties. However, this is an ominous
sign for Egyptian politics. Despite concerted efforts, rang-
ing from intimidation to extra official holidays, to encour-
age citizens to vote, low voter turnout, officially at 28%,
suggests that most Egyptians, including the electoral base
of the Nour in the 2011–2012 election, have become dis-
trustful of political elites and institutions and disengaged
from politics, and that support for the regenerated author-
itarian regime under el-Sisi is low. Furthermore, the growth
of political violence by Salafi and other jihadi groups
whose anti-regime and takfiri messages could better reso-
nate among disaffected Islamist youth diminishes optimism
regarding the stability of the Egyptian political landscape.
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Notes
1. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-
political-showdown-in-egypt-as-court-invalidates-parlia-
ment.html?pagewanted¼all (accessed 15 January 2015).
2. However, see Goodman Hiskey (2008) for the opposite
impact of emigration on voting.
3. Most migrants to the Gulf in the initial migration wave were
Arabs.
4. Hadley (1977: 298) found that there was a high motivation for
people from Arab countries to immigrate to the Gulf. He esti-
mated, for example, that Egyptian teachers received salaries 5.
4 times higher in Saudi Arabia, 4.6 times higher in Libya, and
6.5 times higher in Kuwait than teachers in their home country.
Lawyers in Saudi Arabia received salaries 9.1 times higher.
Such lucrative job opportunities had increased emigration to
the Gulf even before 1974. According to Hadley (1977), in
only 5 years, from 1968 to 1972, around 10,000 doctors, che-
mists, and engineers, 11,000 teachers and, interestingly, 15,000
imams left Egypt to find jobs, mostly in the Gulf and Libya.
5. They were considered politically safe because they were less
likely to bring nationalist and other ideologies with them.
6. In this study, we use the term ‘‘religious remittances’’ to refer
to the transmission of a given religious doctrine to another
country through emigration. The religious doctrines of the
host country are adopted and then transmitted to the emi-
grant’s home country through social interaction and financial
assistance.
7. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/5116/kuwaits-mus-
lim-brotherhood.
8. Even some MB members developed sympathy for the domi-
nant religious doctrines in the Gulf countries. This is not
surprising, as the differences between the two approaches,
Islamism and nonpolitical Salafism, are not that large. While
the former aims to Islamize society through politics, the latter
aims to do so through purifying religious practices.
9. In the United Arab Emirates, the leadership eventually
restricted the employment of Egyptians as imams, security
officials, and other occupations.
10. What are Salafism and Wahhabism? The term Salafi comes
from Salaf (to precede) and refers to the companions of the
Prophet Muhammad who met and learned Islam from him or
those who knew him. The primary goal of Salafi movements
is to eliminate bid’ah (innovation) and return to the pure form
of Islam practiced by the Prophet and Salaf; Salafis consider
interpretations other than their own as deviations from Islam.
It should be noted that all Wahhabis are Salafists but not all
Salafists are Wahhabis. Wahhabism considers itself to be the
true Salafi movement (Moussalli, 2009). Given that Salafism
is a general term that includes Wahhabism, it is used through-
out the article for the sake of simplicity, except where Wah-
habism in particular is meant. Although some divide Salafis
into nonpolitical and political groups, even nonpolitical
groups have a long-term project to create a political system
based on what they consider ‘‘pure Islam’’ (Haykel, 2009;
Wiktorowicz, 2001) Salafis denounced democracies as a
bid’ah, because they usurp God’s role as lawmaker and
rejected party politics because it divides the Ummah into
factions (Haykel, 2009). Salafi ideology, which emphasizes
the purification of religious practices and remained distant
from politics, has been promoted by the Saudi regime’s Wah-
habi elites and other Salafi groups in the country (Meijer,
2009). Salafi groups, active in proselytizing in Saudi society
and supported by private donors or foundations, have also
been running missionary activities among migrants. The
monopoly in religious education and media and organizations
such as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the
Prevention of Vice have increased the prominence of Salafi
doctrines in the country.
11. http://dar.aucegypt.edu/handle/10526/3149 (accessed 12
June 2014).
12. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/01/egypts_
electoral_cunundrum; see https://www.cartercenter.org/
resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/
egypt-2011-2012-final-rpt.pdf for the Carter Center’s on the
election (accessed 3 October 2015).
13. http://www.france24.com/en/20120929-how-saudi-arabia-
petrodollars-finance-salafist-winter-islamism-wahhabism-
egypt (accessed 12 June 2014).
14. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/what-the-salafists-
want-egypt-faces-a-hardline-islamic-future-a-803500.html
(accessed 12 June 2014).
15. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/anatomy-
of-egypts-salafi-surge (accessed 12 June 2014).
16. The Nour in particular was composed of diverse religious
groups whose opinions on women and Copts varied, causing
public outcry, especially among secular groups.
17. See Supplementary Appendix A for the wording of all ques-
tions relevant to this study.
18. The CIA’sWorld Factbook puts the figure at 9%, while other
sources vary; Tadros (2013).
19. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
20. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this important
point.
21. The missing observations in the control variables reduce our
observations in our final models. The non-Gulf emigration
variable in our model does not have any voters for al-Wafd and
the Europe/North America variable does not have anybody for
al-Wafd and al-Wasat, which does not allow the convergence of
the probit model. Therefore, we randomly recoded three obser-
vations from 0 to 1, so that it can converge. The substantive
results are not affected by these three recoded observations.
22. The finding for the Egyptian Bloc is surprising, and this may
be due to the overrepresentation of higher levels of education
in our sample.
23. Due to the data constraints, we could not test the impact of
social services on party choice; but recent work by Masoud
Karakoc¸ et al. 743
(2014) provides extensive evidence that they had an insignif-
icant impact on party choice. We direct readers to his work.
24. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/164/172490/
Egypt/Egypt-Elections-/Free-Egyptians-claim-majority-of-
seats-won-by-any-.aspx (accessed 5 December 2015).
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